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Abstract
A marked acceleration of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in U.S.
manufacturing followed World War I.  This development contributed substantially
to the absolute and relative rise of the domestic economy’s aggregate TFP residual,
which is observed when the “growth accounts” for the first quarter of the twentieth
century are compared with those for the second half of the nineteenth century. Two
visions of the dynamics of productivity growth are germane to an understanding of
these developments. One emphasizes the role of forces affecting broad sections of
the economy, through spillovers of knowledge and the diffusion of general purpose
technologies (GPTs). The second view considers that possible sources of
productivity increase are multiple and idiosyncratic. Setting aside possible
measurement errors, the latter approach regards sectoral and economy-wide surges
of TFP growth to be simply the result of aggregating over many essentially
independent underlying cost reductions, some of which carried more weight than
others.  Although there is room for both views in an analysis of the sources of the
industrial TFP acceleration during the 1920’s, we find the evidence more
compelling in support of the first approach. The proximate source of the TFP surge
lay in the switch from declining or stable capital productivity to a rising output-
capital ratio, which occurred at this time in many branches of manufacturing, and
which was not accompanied by slowed growth in labor productivity. The 1920’s
saw critical advances in the electrification of industry, the diffusion of a GPT that
brought significant fixed capital-savings. But the same era also witnessed profound
transformations in the American industrial labor market, following the stoppage of
mass immigration from Europe; rising real wages provided strong impetus to
changes in workforce recruitment and management practices that were underway in
some branches of the economy before the War. The productivity surge reflected the
confluence of these two forces.4
Early Twentieth Century Productivity Growth Dynamics:
An Inquiry into the Economic History of “Our Ignorance”
A marked acceleration of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in U.S. manufacturing
followed World War I. This development often is overlooked by modern productivity
analysts and economic historians alike. Yet, it contributed substantially to the absolute and
relative rise of the domestic economy’s aggregate TFP residual which is observed when
the “growth accounts” for the first quarter of the twentieth century are compared with those
for the second half of the nineteenth century. In directing closer attention to the surge of
industrial productivity growth during the 1920’s we hope not only to arrive at a fuller
account of that particular episode in the American economy’s development, but to
contribute to a deeper general understanding of the phenomenon of recurrent prolonged
swings in the TFP growth rate that is a feature of the long-term growth records of the
advanced industrial economies.
Two visions of the dynamics of productivity growth are germane to an
understanding of such movements. The first would emphasize the role of innovations
whose resource-saving effects impinged upon many branches of manufacturing
concurrently, especially through spillovers of knowledge and the diffusion of general
purpose technologies (GPTs) into practical use. The second view considers the variegated
possible sources of measured productivity increase, each of which might be relevant to one
or another particular industry or industrial sub-group at some period. Setting aside possible
measurement errors, this latter approach would regard sectoral and economy-wide surges
of TFP growth as simply the result of aggregation over many essentially independent
underlying sources of cost reduction, some of which happened to carry more weight in the
total than others. These visions are elaborated below, in section 1 of the paper.
Although there is room for both views in an analysis of the sources of the industrial
TFP acceleration during the 1920’s, we have found the evidence to be more compelling in
support of the first approach. The proximate source of the TFP surge lay in the switch from
declining or stable capital productivity to a rising output-capital ratio, which occurred at
this time in many branches of manufacturing, as will be seen from the data assembled in
section 2. This change, however, was not accompanied by slowed growth in labor
productivity, as would be expected were the onset of a trend towards “capital-shallowing”
to have been a reflection of the substitution of labor for capital inputs. Indeed, across the
manufacturing sector during the 1920’s, faster growth of capital productivity went hand in
hand with faster growth of labor productivity. The implied shift in production conditions
can be traced to critical advances that were taking place at the time in the electrification of
industry, a phase in the diffusion of a GPT that made possible significant fixed capital-
savings.
But, from detailed examinations of that process whose highlights we review in
section 3, it is evident that realization of the productivity-enhancing potentialities of “the
dynamo revolution” involved a confluence of many other complementary technological
and organizational advances; their implementation had awaited the stimulus eventually
provided by the buoyant macroeconomic conditions of the 1920’s. The post World War I
era also witnessed the results of profound structural transformations in the American
industrial labor market, following the stoppage of mass immigration from Europe. Rising
real wages provided strong impetus to changes in workforce recruitment and management
practices that previously were being tried to a more limited extent in some branches of the
economy. We argue (in section 4) that the induced diffusion of these organizational
adjustments directly supported the growth of industrial output per man-hour, and also5
spurred wider applications of electric power – particularly to tasks formerly performed
largely by unskilled foreign-born workers.  Recruitment of native born workers who had
graduated from high schools was a significant aspect of the upgrading of the industrial
labor force in a number of technologically more sophisticated branches of manufacturing.
But we read the limited evidence available on this point to be consistent with the view that
the enhanced “worker-qualities” most sought by industrial employers at this time were
those of intelligence, diligence and general reliability – for which high school attendance
and graduation may well have served as good signals – rather than specific cognitive
knowledge.
1. “Measures of Ignorance” and Mysteries of TFP Growth Variations
The economics profession has been both bemused and perplexed by total factor
productivity (TFP) growth throughout the five decades or so since the concept was
introduced and its quantitative significance was discovered. That between one-half and
two-thirds of the growth of the U.S. economy’s aggregate real output in the twentieth
century remained unaccounted for by conventional measures of the growth of labor and
capital inputs was shocking news. Good news, if it truly reflected the reduction of the real
cost of goods and services enjoyed by consumers currently and in the future. Yet at the
same time vaguely disturbing, inasmuch as it seemed to leave so much of modern material
progress hostage to developments about which economists had comparatively little to say.
Moses Abramovitz (1956) expressed dismay on the latter score when announcing
his discovery, in a famous passage that continues to deserve quotation:
1
“This result is surprising in the lopsided importance which it appears to give
to productivity increase, and it should be, in a sense, sobering, if not
discouraging, to students of economic growth. Since we know little about
the causes of productivity increase, the indicated importance of this element
may be taken to be some sort of measure of our ignorance about the causes
of economic growth in the United States and some sort of indication of
where we need to concentrate our attention.”
But, Abramovitz went on immediately to suggest that the absolute and relative size
of this unexplained, residual source of growth might reflect not only “the gradual growth
of applied knowledge,” but the effects of economies of scale and deficiencies in the
accounting made for the growth of economically costly inputs. He therefore called for the
development of more sophisticated indexes of improved labor quality, and allowance for
the contributions made to productive capacity growth by “capital formation” of
unconventional sorts, “principally those for health, education and training, and research.”
In the intervening decades an enormous body of methodological and empirical work has
been devoted to the subject of productivity measurement, and much progress may fairly be
claimed to have been made in implementing the research program to which Abramovitz
pointed.
Two principal responses to the brute fact of the TFP residual may be discerned in
the writings of economists who followed in the tracks of the pioneer generation. One group
was disposed towards the side of Abramovitz’s suggested agenda for research that would
                                                       
1 “Resource and Output Trends in the United States since 1870,” American Economic Review, 46(2), May 1956: pp. 5-23,
is reprinted in M. Abramovitz, Thinking About Growth, and Other Essays on Economic Growth and Welfare, Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1989. The passages quoted in the text above appear in the latter at pp. 133-135.6
dispel “ignorance” by correcting “errors and omissions,” specifically those resulting in
understatements of the growth of costly inputs. Following the lead of Dale Jorgenson and
his collaborators, this gave rise to efforts to account for the growth of real output as
completely as possible by reference to costly inputs of resources, minimizing the
magnitude of the embarrassing residual.
2
Even so, such “refinements” as can be made to allow for costly improvements in
the quality of labor and capital services input manage to shrink the residual TFP growth
rate down to a size that remains only preponderant, rather than overwhelmingly
preponderant in relationship to the trend growth rate of labor productivity in the opening
three-quarters of the twentieth century. This may be seen from growth accounts for the
twentieth century US private domestic economy presented in Table 1: compare the “crude”
TFP growth rates for 1890-1927 and 1929-1966 (line 3), which represent roughly 75-80
percent of the corresponding annual growth rates of output per manhour (line 1), with the
67 to 60 percent proportional contribution made by the “refined” estimates of the same
residuals (line 6).
  Moreover, other analysts, influenced by Robert Solow’s (1957) seminal
contribution to the empirical analysis of aggregate production function relationships,
increasingly came to associate the upward course of TFP indexes with efficiency growth
due to “technical progress” – the effects of what Abramovitz had referred to as “the
gradual advances of applied knowledge.”
Table 1.
The popularity of a conceptualization of technological change as a process that
would raise the efficiencies of all the productive inputs in equal proportion encouraged that
direct association. It did so by providing a theoretical foundation for formally identifying
the rate of growth of TFP with the rate of (Hicks neutral) change of technical efficiency,
                                                       
2 On occasion such efforts were carried to excess, as when Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) proposed to include measures
of long-term increases in capital-utilization rates among the inputs in growth accounting. In the view of Denison (1972),
this improperly removed from the TFP residual the effects of gains in utilization intensity that resulted from technical
improvements affecting machine speeds, reductions of down-time for scheduled maintenance and repairs that were not
reflected in the prices of more reliable equipment, better plant management practises, and the like. On the so-called
“capital-utilization controversy” see U.S. Survey of Current Business (1972); Foss (1997): pp. 117-120.7
reflected in shifts in the aggregate production function rather than factor-substitution
movements along its surface.
3
Having been brought up on this interpretation of the movements in measured TFP,
many economists in more recent years found it rather paradoxical, if not utterly baffling,
that the growth accountants’ residual should have all but vanished since the early 1970’s at
the very same time that a wave of major innovations was appearing – in microelectronics,
in communications technologies based on lasers and fibre-optics, in composite materials,
and in biotechnology. Indeed, the notion that there is something anomalous about the
prevailing state of affairs drew much of its initial energy from the apparent failure of the
wave of innovations based on the microprocessor and the memory chip to elicit a surge of
growth in productivity from those very sectors of the U.S. service economy that were
investing so heavily in computers and office equipment.
4
There thus was general consternation, rather than professional celebration, when
the measure of “our ignorance” shrank to the meager dimensions that appear in the figures
for TFP growth in the U.S. economy during the trend period 1966-1989. Table 1 shows the
absolute magnitude of the residual collapsing from levels of 1.5-2.1 percentage points per
annum during 1890-1966 to 0.7 percentage points on a “crude” accounting, and all but
vanishing (0.04 percentage points) on a “refined” reckoning.
5
Despite the attention directed to the so-called productivity paradox, it remains the
case that a very substantial degree of real ignorance persists about the dynamic processes
that reflect themselves in variations of the trend growth rate of total factor productivity,
whether at the aggregate or the sectoral level. The existence of such movements in the
long-run growth records of the advanced industrial economies has not passed entirely
unnoticed. By the end of the 1960’s the role of unprecedentedly rapid TFP growth in post
World War II economic growth among the OECD countries was widely recognized. Even
so, economists and economic historians continue to labor with less than complete success
                                                       
3 Global “Hicks neutrality” is defined as a shift in the production function that leaves the ratio of the marginal
productivities of the inputs unchanged for all factor input combinations. A less restricted (local) Hicks neutrality
condition is one in which for a given set of marginal product ratios of the inputs, the shift in the production technology
leaves the input proportions unchanged. When relative rates of factor remuneration are equal to relative marginal
productivities (as required for cost minimization), Hicks neutral technological change leaves (optimized) factor input
proportions undisturbed at the pre-existing relative input prices. Harrod neutrality, by contrast, specifies that the capital-
output ratio remains undisturbed by technological innovation, for any given marginal productivity of capital; and
conversely. The popularity of the Cobb-Douglas form of production function derives in some part from the algebraic fact
that efficiency changes that are specific to, and hence augment particular inputs, always can be expressed as equivalent to
an equi-proportional (i.e., Hicks neutral) shift in the efficiency of all inputs combined. In other words, for the Cobb-
Douglas function, the input efficiency change can be reinterpreted as being either Hicks neutral or Harrod neutral.
Against these theoretically convenient assumptions of neutrality, Abramovitz and David have argued that there is much
micro- and macro-level evidence suggesting the importance of historical changes in the bias in technological and
organizational innovations. See Abramovitz and David (1973, 1996, 1998); Abramovitz (1993); David (1977).
4 E.g., Roach (1987, 1988); Baily and Gordon (1988). For further discussion, see David and Steinmueller (1999).
5 Indeed, on a still more comprehensive accounting in which intangible human and non-human capital inputs – reflecting
investments in education and training and R&D – are considered, the contraction of the super-refined residual is
sufficient to push the TFP growth rate estimate for 1966-1989 well into the negative zone. See Abramovitz and David
(1998), Tables 1:IV, and 2:IV. Specifically, the comprehensive measurement of inputs with corresponding adjustment of
the (augmented) real GDP growth rate, results in a TFP growth rate of -0.14 percentage points per annum during 1966-
1989, compared with 1.0 percentage points as the average annual rate over the period 1929-1966. The latter finding lends
some indirect support to recent contentions that the official measures of real output growth in the U.S. private domestic
economy may be biased downwards by at least 0.2 percentage points per annum, due to the failure of the price deflators
to fully reflect quality improvements in new goods and services. This state of affairs is not entirely without precedent in
the history of the American economy, but nothing resembling it has been experienced since the era of the Civil War
(1855-1871).8
to explain how that Golden Age of growth came to be so “golden”, and why it gave way
during the 1970’s and 1980’s to what only can be labeled the Tarnished Age of TFP
growth.
6
Moreover, very few economists to date have tried to approach the problem by
identifying the origins of historical eras of high productivity growth. Indeed, few
appreciate the fact that stands out boldly from Table 1’s comparison of the growth
accounts for the nineteenth century trend periods (1800-1855 and 1855-1890) with those
for the era that followed: the expansion of the residual during the 1890-1927 interval
constituted a profound discontinuity in the U.S. long-term growth record. When viewed in
this perspective, the greatly slowed pace of productivity increase that has marked the past
three decades represents a reversion towards the aggregate economic growth performance
that characterized the period 1855-1890. As we remain puzzled about where the TFP
residual went, and whether it will re-emerge in the foreseeable future, perhaps it will be
illuminating to try to learn whence it came from in the first place.
 Our focus in the remainder of this paper therefore is confined to the comparatively
brief watershed era that saw the TFP residual’s rise. The four decades between 1890 and
1930 brought many fundamental structural transformations in the American economy, and
witnessed changes in the pace of aggregate and sectoral productivity advance that were
dramatic by any prior or more recent standard. But, perhaps due to the understandable
obsessive attention devoted to the events immediately preceding and following the crisis of
1929, the antecedent developments affecting productivity have been by and large
overlooked by economic historians and economists alike – even though they were a
harbinger of the form of economic growth that was resumed in full-blown fashion
following World War II.
Uncovering a Forgotten Puzzle: The Post World War I Productivity Acceleration
As a result, a striking and rather intriguing feature of the U.S. pre-1929 productivity
growth record that was first remarked upon by Solomon Fabricant almost forty years ago,
subsequently has remained in obscurity. In his Introduction to John Kendrick’s (1961)
study of productivity trends in the U.S., Fabricant noted (p. xliii):
“A distinct change in trend appeared sometime after World War I. By each
of our measures, productivity rose, on the average, more rapidly after World
War I than before....The change in trend...is one of the most interesting facts
before us. There is little question about it. It is visible not only in the
indexes that Kendrick has compiled for the private domestic economy....It
can be found also in his figures for the whole economy, including
government, as well as in his estimates for the groups of industries for
which individual productivity indexes are available.”
At the heart of this discontinuity in the historical record of productivity growth lay
the particularly marked post-1919 acceleration that was evident in Kendrick’s (1961)
indexes of labor productivity and TFP for the manufacturing sector. This point eluded
Fabricant’s commentary, but it is quite evident that the jump in the TFP growth rate that
occurred during the decade of the 1920’s was greatest in this, the dominant member of the
commodity producing sectors. Whereas Kendrick’s estimates put the decadal growth of
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TFP at approximately 22 percent for the whole of the private domestic economy, the
corresponding figure for manufacturing was 76 percent, and for mining it was 41 percent,
leaving the farm sector in last position with a relatively low gain of 14 percent. Outside the
bounds of commodity production, the transportation sector’s TFP rose during this decade
by 36 percent; the communications and public utilities industries’ 28 percent increase also
outstripped the performance of the private domestic economy, implying that the harder to
measure productivity gains in the trade and services segments were undergoing a still more
sluggish rate of TFP improvement than the 22 percent found for the aggregate economy.
Looking more closely at the timing of labor productivity and TFP movements in
manufacturing, depicted by Figure P1, the surge during the decade 1919-1929 stands out
starkly and the rates for the following sub-periods remain substantially above those for the
three decades between 1899 and 1919.
Figure P1.
These figures, which were derived by David (1991, Table 2) on the basis of
underlying output and labor input data alternative to those used by Kendrick (1961) for the
census years 1869 through 1909, also confirm Fabricant’s perception of a break in trend
following World War I. We may note, however that they indicate rather more rapid
manufacturing productivity growth during the immediate post Civil War decades, and a
correspondingly more pronounced “productivity pause” in the 1890-1914 era.
7  The
resulting time path of the TFP index over the whole of the interval from 1869 to 1949
resembles the “lazy S” seen in Figure P2.
                                                       
7 David (1990, 1991) drew attention to the 1890-1914 U.S. productivity growth pause at the aggregate level and in
manufacturing, but apart from that discussion, only Robert Gordon, in recent years, has commented upon the post World
War I productivity surge and Fabricant’s (1961) remarks.10
Figure P2.
Focusing on the twentieth century portion of the statistical record, we may dispose
of such doubts as may arise about the robustness of the trend break that followed World
War I. The year 1919 was a low point in the business cycle, whereas 1929 was a peak.
Rather than placing too much weight on the changes recorded between those cyclically
non-comparable years, the available annual series for manufacturing output per man-hour
permit estimation of the trend rates of growth for the periods before and after the 1915-
1918 wartime interval. The series and the two trend lines fitted by logarithmic regressions
are presented in Figure P3. These results confirm the discontinuity: the trend growth rate of
labor productivity jumped from 1.5 percentage points per annum to 5.1 percentage points.
A glance at Figure P4, which displays the logarithmic plot of the annual indexes tracing the
movements of output per unit of labor input in each of the major sectors of the private
economy, serves much the same purpose, providing visual confirmation that only the
mining sector came close to matching the abruptness of the trend discontinuity that
separated the pre-War and post-War eras. Having established that Fabricant had indeed
identified a phenomenon worthy of more serious attention than it has received, we must
now turn to consider how best to understand it.
Figure P3.11
Figure P4.
2. Thinking About TFP Growth: Global or Localized, Yeast or Mushrooms?
How should we think about TFP surges in the economy, or in a major sector such as
manufacturing such as occurred in the U.S. in the 1920’s? Perhaps most familiar is the
aggregate-level conceptualization of the sources of input efficiency growth that Arnold
Harberger (1998) characterized in his Presidential Address to the American Economic
Association as a “yeast like” process of uniform expansion. According to this
conceptualization, TFP growth is identified with, and taken to result directly from, very
general and broad advances in technologically applicable knowledge. Against this,
Harberger contends that his vision of “a mushroom process” fits more readily the notion
that TFP growth reflects “real cost reductions stemming from 1001 different causes.”
Mushrooms, offer a particularly suitable metaphor for the growth process in his view,
because “they have the habit of popping up, almost overnight, in a fashion that is not easy
to predict.” What are we to make of this challenging vision, and how far can it help us to
understand the early twentieth century surge of productivity growth in the U.S. economy?
  The more familiar, “yeasty” conceptualization appears on its face to be more-or-
less compatible with the conventional neoclassical production function approach to
aggregate productivity analysis, although it is modifiable, perhaps, by allowing for the
possibility that endogenous as well as autonomous technical progress may be responsible
for the shifts thereof.  But, equally, the vision of a loaf of bread dough ballooning outward
uniformly under the fermenting agency of yeast, also could accommodate the notion that
aggregate TFP growth is produced by the effects of Smithian division of labor,
specialization and scale economies deriving from the expansion of the economy as a
whole. Within such a framework the observed variations in the rate of advance of
knowledge, or in conditions affecting its dissemination and diffusion into practical
application, appear to be the most salient candidate sources of instabilities in the measured
rate of productivity growth over the near-to and medium-run. But, the gap between best
practice and average practice is viewed as approaching an equilibrium, given the constancy
of the underlying rate of embodied efficiency growth; and so changes in that gap are12
unlikely to figure as explanations of more sustained variations in the observed growth rate
of productivity.
On such a view, the equilibrium gap between best and average practice itself
reflects the long-term steady state rate of savings (equal to investment) and the
depreciation rate. The latter, in turn, would have to adjust to the rate of capital-embodied
technical progress, designed obsolescence and durability, and consequently also is not
supposed to undergo endogenous fluctuations due to supply-side forces.  Endogenous
growth theorists have not said much about such temporal variations, which they would
presumably seek to trace to changes in institutions and policies affecting the formation of
human capital, R&D investment, and market opportunities for industrial specialization.
8
The foregoing are not the only possibilities envisioned by the “yeast”
conceptualization.  In an alternative formulation of the way production relationships
change, the global shifting of an aggregate production function disappears from the scene.
TFP increase results instead from localized advances in technological and organizational
practice, arising from constrained “learning by doing” or bounded knowledge searches
conducted in particular industries and sectors. The advances achieved in that fashion are
retained when they prove to be well-suited to the local economic context, but some among
these may prove to be especially susceptible to extension and generalization for application
in a widening sphere of production activities.  Responses to particular factor market
conditions, regionally and temporally specific in nature, can take this form, as David
(1975) and Wright (1990, 1998) have suggested in regard to different phases of U.S.
industrial development. Nathan Rosenberg’s (1963) idea of technological transfer and
convergence, whereby many industries come to adopt the same production methods and
product design approach, equally fits within this vision. This also is the conceptualization
that the theory of general purpose technologies draws upon, as in the work of Timothy
Bresnahan and Manuel Trajtenberg (1996), and the contributors to the volume recently
edited by Elhanan Helpman (1998).
The global change vision of TFP growth that we have sought to adumbrate in the
foregoing discussion lends itself more readily to formulations in which technological
progress is Hicks neutral; whereas allowance for the localized character of technical and
organizational innovations opens greater possibilities for biased (non-neutral) innovations.
Progress taking the latter form might well emerge at a global level through the persistent,
self-reinforcing exploration of certain technological trajectories. Rapid improvement of
efficiency achieved along the latter paths would tend to have a self-reinforcing effect,
rendering such production regimes increasingly dominant under a wider variety of input
price conditions and production scales. In other words, learning that was neutral within a
particular (localized) region of the factor input combination space could give rise to a
global bias in factor savings (David 1975, Ch. 1).
Thus, to give some illustrative concreteness to the point, nineteenth century U.S.
mechanization that was raw-materials-using as well as capital-using was promoted by the
natural resource abundance of that region of recent European settlement. The unit process
for continuous production systems was fixed capital-using and labor-saving, and it came to
be widely diffused from petroleum to chemicals, etc. The fixed transfer-line system of
assembly, beginning with disassembly operations in meat-packing, and in Pullman car
construction, but brought to an advanced state by Ford at Highland Park, Michigan, also
was fixed capital-using and labor saving in relation to batch production systems, yet it was
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susceptible to improvements in throughput speed that made elements of the Ford “factory
regime” applicable in a wide range of industrial settings (Hounshell 1984, Ch. 6, 7).
In juxtaposition to the “yeasty” vision of sources of productivity increase spreading
more-or-less uniformly throughout the economy and its major sectors, Professor Harberger
essays quite another vision involving “mushroom-like growth” at the micro-level. Here the
picture is one of TFP levels shooting upwards only during certain times, and at particular
points in the field of firms and industries. These upsurges are highly localized, but being
idiosyncratic to the business context they are largely independent rather than interrelated
developments that, in addition, do not generate important knowledge spillovers or allied
non-pecuniary externalities. Such variations in the pace of TFP growth as might be
observed at a more aggregative level reflects nothing that could properly viewed as an
underlying generic or global phenomenon; the representative firm conceptualization of the
production function thus would appear to “mushroom-fancying” analysts to be an
uninstructive framework for empirical investigations of economic growth.
Professor Harberger’s association of this vision of “mushroom-like growth” with
the idea that TFP reflects myriad and idiosyncratic sources of cost savings at the (firm and)
industry levels, only a few of which have great leverage over the aggregate, goes further
than issuing a direct challenge to the conceptualization of TFP growth as involving various
kinds of knowledge spillovers. Curiously enough, this vision coincides closely with that
projected by some evolutionary economists, such as Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter
(1982) and Stan Metcalfe (1997), who see TFP growth at the aggregate level as arising
from micro-level innovations of a stochastic nature that are selected for their profit-
generating potential by specific firms. Where they depart from Harberger’s
conceptualization is in emphasizing the process whereby selected innovations become
established as the routines of business entities that, by ploughing back their profits,
accordingly grow in the weight they carry in industry patterns of factor use. In the latter
view what will be observed at the level of aggregate production relations can be
understood only by analysis at the micro-level – which is one message also conveyed by
Harberger’s vision of “mushrooming” TFP growth.  Of course, if one admits the possibility
of purposive imitation among the firms, we return to the model of localized technological
and organizational innovation with spillovers and eventually widespread diffusion.
Whether or not there is a high degree of concentration of TFP gains and cost savings in
some sub-group of activities is then likely to be a matter of the speed of diffusion and the
choice of the time interval over which the measurements are made.
The key feature of the “mushroom-like” conceptualization of productivity growth
that seems most sharply divergent from a “yeast-like” vision is its supposition of a high
degree of independence, or orthogonality, between the conditions that give rise to real cost
reductions in different branches of the economy. The rejection of spillovers and
externalities in the advance of knowledge is one aspect of this. But another would seem to
be a denial of the process of convergence, or confluence, in trajectories of technological
advance that give rise to synergetic, or cross-catalytic effects. For a recent illustration of
such phenomena one need look no farther than the effects of the convergence first of
computing and telecommunications technologies, and to consider within the latter not only
the use of microprocessors for digital switching but the fantastic expansion of bandwidth
by use of laser-pumped optical transmission. To these counter-examples also could be
added the convergence of computer and telecommunications technologies with the
digitization of graphical images and sound, which are transforming the production and
distribution of the entertainment media business. Were that not sufficient to raise doubts14
about the universal validity of the proposition that TFP growth can be traced to
independent, essentially isolated developments, the point should be made that significant
advances in the efficiency of complex production systems are more likely to come about
through the confluence of distinct but complementary developments.
Indeed, such technical complementarities may themselves engender feedback
effects that reinforce the convergence among them. A striking historical illustration of
enhanced system-level real cost savings is provided by Fishlow’s (1966) study of the
innovations underlying the rise of productivity in the U.S. railroad transport sector during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Accelerated TFP growth came about in
this instance through the convergence or “clustering” of diverse complementary
developments that permitted the application of greater locomotive power to achieve higher
train speeds and greater haulage capacities, thereby increasing the intensity with which
both rolling stock and infrastructure could be utilized. But those gains were rendered
realizable only through the introduction of more durable, wear-resistant steel rails,
automatic air-braking, and block signaling and switching technologies; and they were
enabled to affect the operating productivity of railroads as fully as they did because the
introduction of automatic coupling and uncoupling raised the speed and efficiency with
which trains were assembled and disassembled at the endpoints of their journeys, cutting
the idle time of rolling stock.
Nevertheless, we hardly can rely solely on general theoretical considerations, or
historical illustrations from other industries in different periods as our basis for arguing
that Harberger’s (1998) vision of “mushroom-like” growth at the micro-level has only very
limited validity as a guide to understanding the dynamics of the industrial productivity
surge that marked the post-World War I period. The main empirical apparatus that
Harberger proposes in supporting his new vision involves conducting a more disaggregated
examination of productivity movements, in order to determine whether TFP increases
during a given period were highly concentrated in a handful of disparate branches of
production rather than being very evenly distributed across the industrial landscape.
Unfortunately, due to the limitations of the available data needed to ascertain TFP growth
rates for very narrow segments of U.S. manufacturing prior to 1939, exactly the same
approach cannot be applied in the case at hand.  But it is quite feasible for use to look more
closely beneath the sectoral growth rates of manufacturing labor productivity.
A Closer Look at the Pre-1929 Pattern of Productivity Changes in U.S. Manufacturing
What emerges very clearly from our quantitative inquiry is the widespread industrial
participation in the accelerated growth that marked the period after 1919. In Figure P5 the
index numbers of real output per man-hour for 11 industry groups observed at
quinquennial intervals have been graphed on logarithmic scales. In virtually each group the
upward slope became more pronounced during the 1920’s than it had been during the
preceding decade, and in comparison to the trend established between 1900 and 1915. It
will be seen in the next section from the data assembled in Table 4 that 13 of the 14 major
industry groups represented there also participated in the acceleration of the pace of TFP
growth between the decades 1909-1919 and 1919-1929. Transportation equipment was the
exception, only because automobile manufacturing experienced an even faster pace of
productivity gains in the earlier decade.15
Figure P5.
The empirical center-piece of Harberger’s (1998) vision of the growth process is
his analysis of the extent to which, in any period of interest, the observed TFP increases (or
real cost reductions) remain concentrated in a comparatively small portion of the overall
economy, or a major sector therein such as manufacturing. He presents calculations for the
post-World War II U.S. showing that the fractions of manufacturing industry which by
themselves were able to account for the full amount of real cost reduction achieved over
successive five year intervals between 1970 and 1990 ranged downwards from 50 percent
of total value added in manufacturing to as small a share as 12 percent. Since those figures
are based on the same eighteen industry groups that we list in Table 2, it is illuminating to
carry out a similar assessment of the degree of concentration of labor productivity advance
(reductions in real unit costs of labor) during the 1920’s. We can say at the outset that the
divergence from Harberger’s (1998, p. 6) findings is great indeed, because all eighteen
industries enjoyed positive productivity change in our period; consequently, contributions
from virtually the entire ensemble are required to produce the aggregate gain.
The approach taken in developing Table 2 is a minor variant on Harberger’s
scheme of calculations, for, as is explained by the Notes and Sources to the Table, we
examine the concentration in the growth of labor productivity achieved by the eighteen
industry groups, whose estimated value added in 1929 represented about 93 percent of
value added in the entire manufacturing sector. What has been done, in effect, is to find the
weighted average growth rate over the 1919-1929 interval for this ensemble of industry
groups, using the individual industry shares of 1929 value added (in Column 2) to weight
the industry-specific productivity growth rates (as shown in Column 1). The industry
groups are arrayed in the table in descending order of their pace of productivity growth,
and, starting with the Transportation Equipment group at the top, we can cumulate the
proportions of total group value added (in Column 2) and the weighted average rate of the
ensemble (in Column 3) that are being added by each group as one proceeds down the
ranking.16
Table 2.17
The pairs of corresponding cumulative proportions can be displayed graphically as
a Lorenz curve, the curvature of which provides a visual indicator of the degree of
concentration. The very flatness of the curve shown in Figure P6, which never rises far
above the (45-degree) line that indicates complete absence of concentration, makes
immediately apparent the marked divergence of these results for the 1920’s from the
general tenor of the findings that Harberger presents to support his characterization of
industrial productivity growth in the 1970’s and 1980’s as having been more like
“mushrooms” than “yeast.”
Although matching the level of aggregation chosen by Harberger (1998), the
industry groups in Table 2 are still quite broad, and some of them subsume rather
heterogeneous collections of manufacturing branches. A still more disaggregated view of
the labor productivity growth path between decadal benchmarks therefore is presented in
Figure P7, which exhibits the logarithms of output per man-hour indexes for twelve
selected branches of manufacturing that are found within some of the major industry
groups. Yet again the contrast between pre- and post-World War I experience is found to
have been widely shared.18
Figure P6.
Figure P7.
One further, and rather more systematic demonstration can be made of just how
widely distributed was the participation by detailed industrial branches in the wave of rapid
labor productivity advance that marked the 1920’s. As was seen from Table 2, the
weighted average annual growth rate of output per man-hour for the eighteen major19
industry groups stood at 5.36 percentage points during that decade, and the eight groups
whose productivity growth was most rapid all enjoyed annual growth rates that were above
that average, the slowest being Food and Kindred Products which had averaged a rate of
5.38 percentage points per annum.
9 Table 3 takes us within these fast labor productivity
growth groups to find out whether these high group averages reflected the impacts made
upon each by a single high-flying sub-branch – the sort of super-fast-rising “mushrooms”
that Harberger’s model envisages as springing up randomly across the industrial landscape.
For this purpose we have listed in the first column of Table 3 all the sub-branches that
experienced faster productivity growth than the average for the manufacturing sector as a
whole. In all there were twenty-two such branches of manufacturing arrayed under the
eight group headings, and, except for Rubber Products, Tobacco, and Stone Clay & Glass,
there were at least two high flying members within each group and as many as nine, in the
case of the Chemicals and Allied Products group.
Table 3.
We may go a step farther by checking whether Table 3 reveals that no more than a
single sub-branch within each group achieved a rate of productivity growth that stood
about the average rate for the group. Those would constitute “the fastest of the fast,” and it
is true that in the cases of three of the industry groups there was a solitary member of that
elite class. But there were pairs in the cases of Transport Equipment, Chemicals and Allied
                                                       
9 It might be noted from Table 2 that whereas the 1929 value-added weighted average growth rate for the 18 industries
was 5.38 percent per annum, average annual labor productivity growth in the entire manufacturing sector was 5.6 percent.
This implies that changes in the structure of the manufacturing sector during 1919-29 (measured by the shares of value
added) could not have been contributing substantially to the high sectoral productivity growth in that decade.20
Product, Primary Metals, and as many as four of these “super-fast-rising mushrooms” had
sprung up within the Food and Kindred Products group.
  The upshot of the immediately preceding discussion is that an understanding of the
forces that underlay the post-1919 industrial productivity surge is more likely to involve
the identification of some broad, generic developments that were impinging widely upon
U.S. manufacturing activities – at least more likely than would be true of other, less
extraordinary periods, and certainly more likely than would be suggested by the vision of
the growth process that Harberger has proposed. Perhaps what this implies is that the
generality of participation in quickening productivity growth is a feature of surge-like
movements that are discerned at higher levels of aggregation, because it is on those
occasion that the “yeast process” has come to dominate the “mushroom process” that
prevails during episodes of “productivity pause”.
If we can accept that broad but nevertheless quite plausible conjecture as a working
hypothesis, our explanation of productivity dynamics in the early twentieth century U.S.
should be focused upon more global developments, and particularly those that entailed
profound structural changes, and the emergence of widely applicable innovations. Some
clues to the nature of those developments are to be found in the new constellation that
appeared during this period in the behavior of the partial productivity measures for
industry groups within manufacturing.
The scatter diagram displayed in Figure P8, relating the growth of capital and labor
productivity by industry, shows a moderate positive correlation between the two over the
course of the 1919-1929 interval. The cross-section relationship parallels the time-series
association that emerges during the 1905-1927 period in these partial productivity
variables for manufacturing as a whole, and for the private domestic economy as well.
Thus, we are not dealing here with the growth accounting situation envisaged by modern
growth theory, where the growth of labor productivity can be partitioned between the
additive effects of technological and organizational innovation that are supposed directly to
raise the efficiency of labor inputs, and such contributions as result from the rate of
“capital-deepening” in response to falls in the relative rental rate on capital. Rather than
capital-deepening, reflected in a rise in real capital inputs per unit of real output,
manufacturing industries both in aggregate and at the industry group level were undergoing
“capital-shallowing” or rising capital productivity after 1919.
As will be discussed more fully in section 4, a long period of stasis in the real unit
costs of industrial labor during 1890-1914 came to an end with the outbreak of World War
I and the ensuing rapid rise in the price of labor inputs vis-à-vis the prices of both capital
inputs and gross output was sustained during the post-War decade. The change in relative
factor prices thus was in a direction that would tend to induce the substitution of capital for
labor within the pre-existing set of production technologies. Therefore, it is particularly
striking that after 1919 the rise of capital-intensity in U.S. manufacturing proceeded at a
greatly retarded pace.  Between the 1889 and 1909 census benchmark dates, the ratio of
capital inputs per unit of labor input was rising at the average rate of 2.6 percentage points
per year, and the pace quickened to 2.8 percent per annum over the decade 1909-1919. But
during the 1920’s, despite the upsurge of real wage growth, the growth in capital-intensity
slowed to 1.2 percentage points per annum, well below half its previous pace.
10 This
change, and the emergence of “capital-shallowing” with which it was linked, represented a
                                                       
10 The figures cited are based upon Kendrick’s (1961; Table D-I) indexes of manufacturing capital input and labor input
(which in this period closely tracks manufacturing manhours).21
new departure, reflecting the diffusion of the new production regime in manufacturing that
was based upon applications of the electric dynamo.
Figure P8.
3. Electrifying Manufacturing
In the dynamo revolution, as David (1990, 1991) has pointed out, one may recognize the
emergence of an extended trajectory of incremental technical improvements, the gradual
and protracted process of diffusion into widespread use, and the confluence with other
streams of technological innovation, all of which are interdependent features of the
dynamic process through which a general purpose engine acquires a broad domain of
specific applications.  Successful exploitation of the new technology’s evolving
productivity potential over the period from the early 1890’s to 1929 entailed the production
and financing of investment projects whose novelty – in terms of scale, technical
requirements, or other characteristics – posed significant challenges for the existing
agencies supplying capital goods and the established capital market institutions. Although
their realization was delayed for decades after the engineering possibilities were first
appreciated, these developments finally bore fruit in the surge of TFP growth in the
manufacturing sector that was concentrated in the post-World War I era.
The Pace of the Dynamo Revolution in Theory and Practice
The history of electrification
11 from 1900 onwards lends considerable plausibility to the
“regime transition thesis” advanced by Freeman and Perez (1986). Addressing the modern
productivity paradox, these writers suggested that the pace of TFP growth well might
remain sluggish for an extended duration because the emergence and elaboration of a new
techno-economic regime based on computer and communications innovations –
supplanting the mature, ossified Fordist regime of mass production – would, more than
likely, be a protracted and historically contingent affair. In much the same fashion as the
                                                       
11 See e.g., Hughes (1983), Schurr et al. (1991), on the U.S. experience; see Byatt (1979), on Britain; Minami (1987), on
Japan.22
present-day enthusiasts of the information age have heralded the revolutions to be wrought
by the advent of universal access to massive amounts of computing power, at the opening
of the twentieth century there were farsighted electrical engineers who already had
envisaged many of the profound transformations that the dynamo revolution would bring
to factories, stores, and homes. But the materialization of those presbyopic visions was less
imminent than it appeared to be to many at the time.
Certainly, the transformation of industrial processes by the new electric power
technology was a long-delayed and far from automatic business. It did not acquire real
momentum in the U.S. until after 1914-17, when the rates charged to consumers of
electricity by state-regulated regional utilities fell substantially in relationship to the
general price level, and central station generating capacity came to predominate over
generating capacity in isolated industrial plant. Particularly rapid gains in the efficiency of
electricity generation during 1910-1920 underlay these developments.
12 This closely
reflected the fact that the number of kilowatt-hours of power per dollar of central station
generating costs (in constant prices) was increasing at the average rate of 9.4 percent per
year, whereas over the two preceding decades (1890-1910) it had been rising at 5.0 percent
per annum. To realize the economies of scale that were attainable with immense central
power plants that used high-speed steam turbines to drive massive alternating current
generators required more than the very substantial direct investments represented by such
facilities. For one thing, it necessitated the integration and extension of power transmission
networks over an expanded territory. Within a larger service area the greater diversity of
electricity users contributed to mitigating the peak-load problem; load-balancing improved
the utilization of fixed capacity, to which the cost structure of the industry was extremely
sensitive.
But this was not simply a matter of technology. Significant adaptations in other
dimensions affecting business practice were called for. In the American setting, two “social
innovations”, pioneered by Samuel Insull at the Chicago-based Commonwealth Edison Co.
greatly facilitated the channeling of investment into the formation of regional electric
utilities during the century’s second decade.
13 One was an adjustment of the political
environment, advantageously affecting the terms on which long-term monopoly franchises
could be secured, and reducing the transaction costs entailed in obtaining franchises to
operate in many contiguous communities.
14 This change was largely accomplished during
the period 1907-1914, through a campaign (on the part of the National Electric Light
Association) to transfer regulatory authority over the electricity supply business from
municipal and town governments to specially created state public utility commissions. The
second “innovation” was the application (first by Insull, in creating the Middle West
Utilities Co. in 1912) of the holding company form of corporate organization to the
problem of financing both the acquisition and the incremental investment needed to
physically integrate numerous small, local utility operations within an extensive, centrally
managed regional network.
15
                                                       
12  See David (1991): Table 4 and Figure 14. Also Schurr et al. (1991). Estimates of TFP growth in the electric utility
industry made by Kendrick (1961: Table H-VI) show a sharp acceleration during 1909-1919.
13 See Platt (1991): esp. Ch. 7, on Insull, the Commonwealth Edison Company and the formation of regional network in
the Midwest.
14  See MacDonald (1962): pp. 82-89, 114-17, 177-78.
15 The success of the campaign to shift regulatory authority to the state level owed much to its coincidence with the
political movement for civic reform, and the waning enthusiasm for municipal ownership of utilities, following the23
Factory electrification did not reach full fruition in its technical development and in
its impact on productivity growth in manufacturing before the early 1920’s, at which time
only slightly more than half of factory mechanical drive capacity had been electrified, as
may be seen from Figure E1. This was four decades after the first central power station
opened for business.
Figure E1.
The proximate source of the delay in the exploitation of the productivity
improvement potential incipient in the dynamo revolution was, in large part, the long time
it took before substantial gains were being achieved from year-to-year in the proportion of
mechanical drive that was electrified, especially by the substitution of purchased current
for factory-generated power. The delay, in turn, was attributable to the unprofitability of
replacing still serviceable manufacturing plants embodying production technologies
adapted to the old regime of mechanical power derived from water and steam.
Thus, it was the American industries that were enjoying the most rapid expansion
in the early twentieth century – tobacco, fabricated metals, transportation equipment, and
electrical machinery itself – that afforded greatest immediate scope for the construction of
new, electrified plants along the lines recommended by progressive industrial engineers.
16
More widespread opportunities to embody best-practice manufacturing applications of
electric power awaited the further physical depreciation of durable factory structures, the
locational obsolescence of older-vintage industrial plants sited in urban core areas, and,
                                                                                                                                                                       
collapse of the market for municipal bonds in the Rich Man’s Panic of 1907. This suggests the historically contingent
character of some of the developments that shaped the evolution of the electricity supply industry and its consequences
for the transformation of manufacturing technology. On financial holding companies in the utility industry, see
MacDonald (1962): Ch. 5.
16  See DuBoff (1979): p. 142; Minami (1987): pp.138-41.24
ultimately, the development of a general fixed capital formation boom in the expansionary
macroeconomic climate of the 1920’s.
From the beginning of the century onward, there were farsighted electrical
engineers who envisaged many sources of cost-savings that would result from exploiting
the flexibility of a power transmission system based on electric wires, especially the
efficiency gains that would be obtained by replacing the system of shafting and belts with
the so-called “unit drive” system.  In the latter arrangement individual electric motors were
used to run machines and tools of all sizes.
17 But, as will be seen, the benefits of the unit-
drive system would be reaped fully by building a new kind of factory, whereas the
persistence of durable industrial facilities, embodying older power generation and
transmission equipment, had some perverse consequences for average capital productivity
that are worth noticing. During the phase of the U.S. factory electrification movement
extending from the mid-1890’s to the eve of the 1920’s, the “group drive” system of power
transmission had remained in vogue.
18
With this system – in which electric motors turned separate shafting sections so that
each motor would drive related groups of machines – the retrofitting of steam- or water-
powered plants typically entailed adding primary electric motors to the original stock of
equipment. From photographs of the Ford Co.’s Highland Park Plant taken shortly after its
opening in 1913, one can see that even in this relatively new plant overhead group-drive
equipment had been installed alongside the old mechanical system of power transmission
using shafts and belting (see Hounshell 1984, pp. 232, 250). Owners of pre-existing
factories rationally could ignore the sunk costs of the installed shaft and belting equipment,
and act on a calculation that the benefits – in the form of reduced power requirements and
improved machine speed control – justified the marginal capital expenditures required to
install the group drive system. Productivity accountants, by contrast, have to reckon that
the original (belt and shaft) power transmission equipment, and the primary engines that
powered them, remained in place as available capacity. The effect of the incremental
investments in electrification using group drive would be to raise the capital-output ratio in
manufacturing, thereby militating against rapid gains in measured TFP.
19
  During the initial phase of the dynamo revolution in industry, while electric motors
driven by purchased energy still represented only 10-15 percent of total manufacturing
horsepower, as was the case during 1919-1925 (Gould 1946), the rising proportion of total
factory drive capacity that took the form of secondary motor horsepower reflected the
diffusion first of the group drive system, and later of the unit drive system. As may be seen
from Figure E1, secondary electric motor capacity as a proportion of electric and non-
electric direct drive horsepower rose from 33 percent to 56 percent between 1919 and
1929.
The advantages of the unit drive for factory design turned out to extend well
beyond the savings in inputs of fuel derived from eliminating the need to keep all the line
                                                       
17 For further description see Devine (1983), pp. 362ff; David (1991); Schurr et al.(1991): esp. Ch. 1, pp. 29-30 and 292-
293.
18 This would be so especially if the energy input savings, and the quality improvements from better machine control
were left out of the productivity calculation. See Duboff (1979): p. 144; Devine (1983): pp. 351, 354.
19 This sort of overlaying of one technical system upon a pre-existing stratum is not unusual during historical transitions
from one technological paradigm to the next. Examples could be cited from the experience of the steam revolution (von
Tunzelmann 1978: pp. 142-43, 172-73). Indeed, the same phenomenon has been remarked upon recently in the case of
the computer’s application in numerous data processing and recording functions, where old paper-based procedures are
being retained alongside the new, microelectronic-based methods – sometimes to the detriment of each system's
performance (see, e.g., Baily and Gordon 1988: pp. 401-02).25
shafts turning, and the greater energy efficiency achieved by reducing friction losses in
transmission. Factory structures could be radically redesigned once the need for bracing, to
support the heavy shafting and belt-housings for the transmission apparatus that typically
was mounted overhead, had been dispensed with. This afforded (1) savings in fixed capital
through lighter factory construction, and (2) further capital savings from the shift to
building single-story factories, whereas formerly the erection of more costly multi-story
structures had been dictated by the desirability of reducing power-losses in turning very
long line shafts, and the problems of variation in machine speed that increased with the
length of those shafts. Single-story linear factory layouts, in turn, permitted (3) closer
attention to optimizing materials handling, and flexible reconfiguration of machine
placement and handling equipment to accommodate subsequent changes in product and
process designs within the new structures. Related to this, (4) the modularity of the unit
drive system and the flexibility of wiring curtailed losses of production incurred during
maintenance, rearrangement of production lines, and plant retrofitting. With fully
electrified factory drive, the entire power system of the plant no longer had to be shut
down in order to make changes in one department or section of the mill.
20
Although all this had been clear enough in principle c. 1903-5, the relevant point is
that its implementation on a wide scale required working out the details in the context of
many kinds of new industrial facilities, in many different locales, thereby building up a
cadre of experienced factory architects and electrical engineers familiar with the new
approach to manufacturing.  The decentralized sort of learning process that this entailed
was dependent upon the volume of demand for new industrial facilities at sites that favored
reliance upon purchased electricity for power. It was, moreover, inherently uncertain and
slow to gain momentum, owing in part to the structure of the industry responsible for
supplying the capital that embodied the new, evolving technology. The business of
constructing factories and shops remained extremely unconcentrated and was characterized
by a high rate of turnover of firms and skilled personnel.  Difficulties in internalizing and
appropriating the benefits of technical knowledge acquired in such circumstances is likely
to slow experience-based learning. A theoretical analysis of an interdependent dynamic
process involving diffusion and incremental innovations based upon learning-by-doing
demonstrates that where the capital goods embodying the new technology are
competitively supplied and there are significant knowledge spillovers among the firms in
the supplying industry, the resulting pace of technology adoption will be slower than is
socially optimal.
21
                                                       
20  For further discussion of the technical implication of the unit drive system, see Schurr et al. (1991): esp. Ch. 1, pp. 29-
30 and 292-293.
21  See David and Olsen (1986, 1992) for further discussion.26
Figure E2.
The replacement of prime movers by purchased electricity, and shafts and belting
by wires as the means of power transmission within the factory, came as part of a package
ultimately involving new plant design and the necessary relocation of manufacturing to
suitable greenfield sites outside the old urban core districts. That in turn entailed the
provision of suitable transport services via surfaced roads and motor trucks to industrial
sites not served by the existing railroad network. While new investment was entailed in all
this, much of it was undertaken outside manufacturing, whereas within that sector there
were readily quantifiable resource savings. These are noticeable in the behavior of capital
productivity measures. From Figure E2 it is evident that in all save two of the seventeen
industry groups shown, the Kendrick (1961) index of capital input per unit of output was
declining during the decade 1919-1929; whereas during this ratio had been rising in every
one of the industries during 1899-1909, and in twelve of the seventeen cases during 1909-
1919. Was there an immediate connection between the reversal of the prior trend toward
capital-deepening, and the factory electrification movement in the 1920’s?
Of course, by supplanting equipment that previously supplied mechanical drive, the
switch to purchases of electric energy from central power stations lowered the capital
requirements in manufacturing establishments in a direct way, an instance of sectoral
capital-savings achieved through out-sourcing. But rather than interpreting the purely
organizational aspect of that change as a source of enhanced overall manufacturing
efficiency, it would be more satisfactory to work with a measure of TFP growth in
manufacturing that adjusted for the growth of energy inputs purchased from outside the
sector, just as has been the practice in examining the acceleration of TFP at the individual
industry level. A rough adjustment of this kind can be made, which, naturally, shrinks the
size of the multifactor productivity residual. But, rather surprisingly, the estimated amount27
by which the total input efficiency growth rate for the decade 1919-29 exceeds that for the
preceding decade remains little changed, at 5.3 percentage points per annum.
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But, beyond the real cost savings that were achieved through the substitution of
purchased (electric) energy for capital equipment in the form of prime movers in
manufacturing plants, the foregoing discussion points to some overall capital-saving
effects that accompanied the diffusion of the unit drive system and the new plants that
were being designed around it during this era. Quantitative confirmation of this association
can be found from the scatter diagram displayed in Figure E3: there is indeed a positive
correlation across industrial groups between the average productivity of capital and the
share of primary horsepower that was electrified in 1919. Furthermore, this association was
more pronounced among the industry groups for which the later share ranged upwards
from the 50 percent mark. By 1929, it can be seen, all of the industry groups had moved
into the latter range, and the rising slope of the cross-section relationship became still more
pronounced.
Figure E3.
As one may see from Figures P8 or E4, during the 1920’s the rates of change in the
average productivities of capital and labor inputs for all the manufacturing industry groups
lay in the positive quadrant, and in the industry cross-section there was a positive
association between them. Since a positive relationship has been observed between capital
productivity and the electrification of primary power, one might suppose that the weighted
sum of the partial productivity growth rates, i.e., the value-added TFP growth measure,
also would be positively associated with increasing electrification of primary horsepower.
But that particular relationship turns out to be quite loose in the industry cross-section,
which ought not to be so surprising, as correlation relationships are not transitive.
                                                       
22 See the estimates of TFP adjusted for purchased energy inputs, in Woolf (1984).28
Figure E4.
In any case, since purchased electric power was a (costly) replacement for primary
power-generating facilities in the plant, the productivity growth measures of interest here
are those in which TFP has been adjusted to take account of purchased energy inputs.
These are available for 14 of the major industry groups that are listed in Table 4. The first
column of entries in the table shows the percentage point per annum acceleration in the
adjusted TFP residual between the 1910’s and the 1920’s. The second column presents the
corresponding proportionate increase of secondary electric motor capacity installed by the
industry between 1919 and 1929.
23 The existence of a positive rank correlation is directly
visible when the two columns are compared, and a statistically significant relationship is
found between the two variables – described by the linear regression line among the scatter
of points in Figure E5.
24
                                                       
23 Making use of this cross-section relationship, David (1991) found that approximately half of the 5 percentage point
acceleration recorded in the aggregate TFP growth rate of the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1919-1929 (compared
with 1909-1919) could be accounted for statistically simply by the growth in manufacturing secondary electric motor
capacity during that decade. The alternative cross-section regression results presented below suggest a somewhat
different imputed effect electrification during the 1920’s.
24 The regression results are those given by David (1991): p. 343, n. 17. From the scatter in Figure E5 the reader might
surmise that although the relationship is significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. The proportion of the variance
that is explained (adjusted for degrees of freedom) is only 0.251.29
Figure E5.
What is implied when this simple cross-section relationship within the
manufacturing sector is taken in conjunction with the 1.8-fold increase observed during the
1920’s in the share of aggregate direct factory drive represented by secondary motor
capacity? The predicted extent of the acceleration of adjusted TFP is about 2.4 percentage
points for the sector as a whole, or slightly under one half of the estimated jump (of 5.3
percentage points) that occurred in the correspondingly adjusted TFP growth rate for the
U.S. manufacturing sector between 1909-1919 and 1919-1929. Of course, such a
calculation only can be accepted at face value if one thought that the temporal process
surrounding the diffusion of the unit drive system, and reflected by the penetration of
secondary motor capacity in factory drive, had involved little else than a shifting of the
whole sector along the cross-section regression line.
As simplistic a view of the matter as that may be, the very substantial putative
effect of the widening adoption of the unit drive system is impressive, the more so because
it hardly comprehends the full productivity ramifications of the dynamo revolution in the
industrial sector during the 1920’s. A further important source of measured productivity
gains during this era can be identified in the capital-saving effects of the technological and
organizational innovations that underlay the growth of continuous process manufacturing
and the spread of continuous shift-work, most notably in the petroleum products, paper,
and chemical industries.
25 Although these developments did not involve the replacement of
shafts by wires, they were bound up indirectly with the new technological regime built up
around the electric dynamo. Advances in automatic process control engineering were
dependent upon use of electrical instrumentation and electro-mechanical relays. More
fundamentally, electrification was a key complementary element in the foregoing
                                                       
25 See Lorant (1966): Chs. 3, 4, 5; Foss (1970): Pt. 2, sections 1 and 3 on shift-working and capital utilization in
manufacturing circa 1929.30
innovations, because pulp-and paper-making, chemical production, and petroleum refining
were the branches of manufacturing that made particularly heavy use of electricity for
process heat. The same was true also of the primary metals, and stone, clay and glass
industries, where there were similar movements towards electrical instrumentation for
process control and greater intensity in the utilization of fixed facilities.
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Has the TFP Surge Been Underestimated? Unmeasured Quality Changes
It might appear from the foregoing discussion that we are in danger of explaining too much
of the observed quickening of manufacturing TFP growth that occurred in the 1920’s
simply by reference to the direct and indirect effects of electrification. But that impression
may be somewhat illusory, inasmuch as there were important unmeasured gains in the
quality of many of the new products that issued from America’s factories during this
decade.  Quite apart from the new makes of automobiles, we should keep in mind the
amazing range of new consumer durables, many of which themselves were electricity-
driven; as well as many new kinds of producers’ equipment, ranging beyond electric
motors, to motor trucks and buses, diesel locomotives, aircraft, and so on. Thus, the true
surge in output and hence in total factor productivity growth may be considerably
underestimated by the available estimates.
But on the other side of the ledger, it is equally worth remarking that electrification
itself brought unmeasured improvements in the working conditions to which
manufacturing employees were exposed. As has been pointed out earlier in our discussion,
the initial commercial applications of the dynamo during the 1890-1914 era were
concentrated in the fields of lighting equipment and urban transit systems. Notice, then,
that qualitative improvements in characteristics such as brightness, ease of maintenance,
and fire safety were especially important attributes of incandescent lighting for factories, as
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well as for shops and homes – the early electric lighting systems having been designed to
be closely competitive with illuminating gas on a cost basis. Productivity growth in
newspaper publishing was mainly realized in the form of higher throughput rates which
permitted faster dissemination of news to the public. Likewise, the contributions to the
improvement in economic welfare in the form of faster trip speeds and shorter passenger
waiting times afforded by electric streetcars, and later by subways – not to mention the
greater residential amenities enjoyed by urban workers who were able to commute to the
central business district from more salubrious residential neighborhoods – all of which
remained largely uncaptured by the conventional indexes of real product and
productivity.
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Measurement biases of this kind persisted in the later period of factory
electrification, most notably in regard to some of the indirect benefits of implementing the
unit drive system.  One of these was the improvement in machine control achieved by
eliminating the problem of belt slippage and installing variable speed D.C. motors. This
change yielded better quality, more standardized output without commensurately increased
costs, as Warren Devine (1983: pp. 363ff) has noticed. Factory designs adapted to the unit
drive system also brought improvements in working conditions and safety. Lighter, cleaner
workshops were made possible by the introduction of skylights where formerly overhead
transmission apparatus had been mounted. And there were gains from the elimination of
the myriad strands of rotating belting that previously swirled dust and grease through the
factory atmosphere; and which, when not enclosed within safety screening, would maim or
kill workers who became caught up in them.  To the extent that growing concerns with
workman’s compensation costs, fire hazards from open gas flames and dust particle
explosions, and other safety considerations led manufacturing employers to value the
benefits that factory electrification would bring in these regards, we would expect that the
prices paid for newly designed plant might reflect some of these dimensions of quality
improvement. But, although the measured flow of capital services would be raised on the
latter account, our conventional concept of manufacturing output is not comprehensive
enough to accommodate the idea that improved working conditions, and reduced hazards
of losses from accidents and fire, also were forms of “output” being produced jointly with
marketed goods. This potential source of downward measurement bias should be added to
allowances for improvements in the quality of marketed output, in order to arrive at a full
picture of the growth of overall productivity in manufacturing. But the effect of doing so
would not appear greatly to diminish our assessment of the quantitative impact contributed
by the transition to the dynamo regime.
The transition has been seen to have been complex, involving more than the
installation of electric motors in factories. Advances in electrical engineering, in factory
architecture, and in motor-truck transportation, converged with the alteration of the power
technologies and the organization of work in manufacturing establishments to reduce real
costs across a wide array of America’s manufacturing industries during the 1920’s. While
the developments just reviewed may be said to form the core of the industrial dynamo
revolution, they were not a self-contained dynamic process. Rather, there were other,
equally profound changes taking place during this era that interacted with the diffusion of
the dynamo and contributed to raising the productivity of the resources engaged in
manufacturing. Among these, the transformation in the labor market and its consequences
for the character of the U.S. industrial workforce, and the personnel management practices
of manufacturing firms, must command center stage in the remaining discussion.
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4. The “New Era” in the U.S. Labor Market and Its Productivity Consequences
When Harry Jerome and his colleagues surveyed American manufacturing during the
1920’s, one development they found across a wide range of industries was the use of
electrification to save labor in the physical handling of materials. As Jerome (1934, p. 179)
wrote: “even the most diverse industries have one operation in common – handling. In all it
is necessary to move materials from one processing operation to the next.” Although
handlers numbered less than one-fifth of nonsupervisory workers, fully half of all reported
labor-saving changes were in handling rather than processing operations (p. 189). Directly
and indirectly, the application of electrical technology lay at the heart of these innovations
in industrial practice: the use of electric trucks and tractors come in for particular emphasis
(see Jerome’s discussion), as do electric cranes and hoists, and continuous conveyor belts
that by that time were mainly run by electricity. Central to the cost reductions in handling
operations was the rearrangement of the factory layout made possible by electrification,
serializing machines and processes by rerouting the flow of materials, and thereby
reducing or eliminating “back-tracking” (pp. 190-191). All of this was an integral part of
the shift toward more continuous operation and more intensive utilization of the capital
stock; but elimination of handling labor had its greatest impact on labor “of the unskilled
type” (p. 190).
Now if we ask ourselves whether electrification per se was strictly necessary for
these labor-saving changes, the answer must be no, not exactly. Labor-saving technology
was a hallmark of American manufacturing from early in the nineteenth century, and firms
had long searched for ways to increase machine speeds using steam and water power;
doubtless they would have continued to do so, had electric power never appeared on the
scene. But during the 1920’s the electrification movement in U.S. manufacturing industries
was in full swing, and, as it also happened, changes in the labor market offered powerful
incentives to channel the impact of that in an unskilled-labor-saving direction. Thus we can
understand the extraordinary performance of that decade most accurately as the product of
a true confluence between these two streams of technological development.
Perhaps the clearest single indicator of the contemporary change in the labor
market is the sharp increase in the real hourly wage in manufacturing, as depicted in Figure
L1. The data displayed are from the comprehensive real wage study by Paul Douglas
(1927, 1930).
28  Douglas’s cost-of-living index has been questioned by Albert Rees (1961),
on the basis of better evidence on rents and the prices of new consumer goods. But
measures of workers’ economic welfare are not our primary concern at present. The
bottom line to employers was the price of an hour’s labor relative to the cost of materials
and products in the economy, and for this purpose an all-commodity wholesale price
deflator yields a more appropriate index. By this measure, the real wage was virtually flat
across the entire period 1890-1914, as may be seen in Figure L1. Any analysis of the
productivity revolution of the 1920’s, however, must come to grips with the fact that the
real price of labor in that decade was between 50 and 70 percent higher than it had been a
decade before. The subsequent absolute rise of the real price of industrial labor also was
translated into a dramatic relative increase in the level of annual real earnings of
manufacturing workers vis-à-vis those in transportation and service sector employments,
which is reflected by the movement of the series in Figure L2. There is a clear parallel
between this alteration of the structure of real earnings in the post World War I era, on the
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one hand, and the fact that the upsurge of productivity growth during that period was




What was the cause of the striking change in relative wages and earnings? The one-
time jump in real hourly industrial wages between 1920 and 1921 could be viewed as the
artificial result of accidents of timing and price adjustment. Labor markets were extremely34
tight under wartime conditions, but nominal wages and prices chased each other somewhat
inconclusively between 1914 and 1919. Then the postwar boom ended with the collapse of
commodity prices at the end of 1920, but as nominal wages were relatively sticky, the
wage-price ratio leapt sharply upwards. A lag in nominal adjustments, however, can hardly
be the full explanation for the pattern displayed; had real wages been above sustainable
levels for accidental reasons in 1921, we would expect to see them decline gradually
toward a lower equilibrium level thereafter. Instead, we see that the new real wage plateau
was not only maintained during the 1920’s, but actually continued to drift upwards
between 1921 and 1928.
Evidently, there were important “real” forces affecting the industrial labor market
in this era. To most observers, the immediately apparent real change was the cutting off of
the mass European immigration that had supplied the bulk of the labor for American
factories for the previous half century or more. Immigration averaged more than one
million arrivals per year during the decade prior to 1914, and the foreign born comprised
the majority of the wage-earners in such basic industries as iron and steel, farm machinery,
automobiles, cotton goods, clothing, oil refining and meatpacking. But these flows were
reduced to a trickle with the outbreak of the war, and this closure was then decisively
ratified by legislation in 1920 and 1924. Thus, employers could not anticipate being able to
push real manufacturing wages back down to prewar levels, because they could no longer
deploy immigrant workers in massive numbers for this purpose.
This interpretation is consistent with the observation that the greatest upward
pressure on wage rates was felt at the low end of the wage distribution. The labor scarcities
of 1916-1919 generated a sharp compression of wage differentials in general, and these
were only partially restored during the 1920’s. Figure L2 displays this pattern for two
“middle class” occupational categories, clerical workers in manufacturing and steam
railroads, and federal government employees, relative to wage earners in manufacturing. It
is evident that manufacturing labor had become very expensive at the time of the
productivity revolution, especially relative to office workers and managers.
Not only did relative wages rise during the 1920’s, but behavioral patterns in the
labor market also changed markedly. One manifestation of the new regime was the radical
reduction in rates of turnover. Brissenden and Frankel (1920) estimate that separations per
100 employees averaged nearly 100 during 1910-1914 – i.e. one worker left for every one
who stayed on the job. But according to Berridge (1929), the rate fell to less than 40
separations per hundred employees between 1923 and 1928. The bulk of the decline was in
voluntary quits, but worker dismissals by firms also was cut in half between the two
periods. These shifts are not artifacts of changes in macroeconomic conditions. Careful
econometric studies demonstrate that when account is taken of the normal responsiveness
of turnover to such factors in unemployment and wage dispersion, the bulk of the decline
remains unexplained (Sundstrom 1986; Owen 1995), an apparent change in prevailing
labor market norms.
Indeed, economic historians have debated alternative interpretations of the fall in
turnover rates. Jacoby (1983) argues that the primary cause was a decline in labor mobility
as a consequence of changes in the composition of the industrial labor force. In comparison
to their prewar counterparts, the manufacturing wage-earners of the 1920’s were more
mature; more likely to be married with dependents; had more years of schooling in
America and a better command of English; they were more committed to America as a
place to live, and to industrial work as a lifetime occupation. Not every item on this list is35
objectively measurable, but each one is a logical consequence of a fundamental shift from
an immigrant to a native-born labor supply.
In contrast, Owen (1995) argues that turnover behavior must be understood in the
light of the active efforts by employers to stabilize their workforces, by increasing the costs
of separation to workers and by offering opportunities for advancement and enhanced job
security with increases in tenure. Beginning with the War, growing numbers of employers
established personnel departments for precisely this purpose, centralizing decisions over
hiring and firing (as opposed to the arbitrary discretion exercised under the “foremen’s
empire”), and using tenure as a criterion in compensation, promotion and layoff decisions.
Jacoby (1983) estimates that the share of large industrial firms with personnel departments
grew from less than 7 percent in 1915 to 25 percent in 1920. Remarkably, this share did
not decline when wartime labor pressures eased; it continued to expand through the
decade, reaching 34 percent in 1929.  Personnel department objectives were reinforced by
a diverse range of incentives and inducements, from savings and insurance plans, to health
benefits, recreational opportunities and representation schemes loosely known as “welfare
capitalism.”
29
It seems evident to us that this is a context where the classic assumption of
independence between the supply and demand sides of the market does not do justice to
the situation. The objective conditions of labor supply in the open market were of course
generally beyond the power of individual firms to alter. But to employers entering that
market on a probabilistic basis, the range of feasible options was altered by the change in
composition of the underlying pool. Not every firm would want to make such a change, but
for those who saw the possibility of a positive return to stabilizing and upgrading their
labor forces, the prospects for doing so were now enhanced. For others, the reality of
coping with a high, sticky real wage level may have left them with little choice but to raise
their hiring standards and retain workers longer.  Such decisions by firms, in turn, created
incentives for mature heads of households to commit to industrial work; and for younger
men to make plans for marriage and family in this context. Reinforcing changes on both
sides of the market can generate something like a “regime change” establishing a new set
of relationships that we may call the High Wage Economy.
Organizational Adjustments and Workforce Upgrading in the High Wage Economy
Economists are not in the habit of accepting the self-serving claims of private business
firms at face value, and, unquestionably, there was a fair quotient of public-relations
salesmanship in the popular High Wage talk of the 1920’s. Why then do we take this
rhetoric seriously? For one thing, one cannot escape the objective evidence that many firms
were in fact investing substantial resources in implementing personnel plans and
cultivating their workforce. The encouragement to do so came not just from self-promoting
efficiency experts, but from the highest levels of government; most prominently, from
Herbert Hoover, first as Secretary of Commerce and later as President. Behind the high
wage philosophy was a broadly-based political coalition, including political reformers,
“progressive” businessmen, and self-interested adult male workers. Exhortations to hire
more selectively and invest more in those hired were reinforced by a range of public
policies that pointed in the same direction. For example, legal changes in the areas of
industrial safety and liability increased the effective costs of hiring and training (Owen
1995, p. 824). Restrictions on the use of “child labor” and continuing increases in the age
of compulsory schooling delayed the age of first employment by something between two
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and five years relative to prewar norms (Osterman 1981, p. 54). Goldin (1990) shows that
“marriage bars” restricting the employment of married women diffused extensively
through the economy in the 1920’s, in private as well as public sector employment.
Many of these political and ideological currents represent trends that had been
underway for a much longer historical period, perhaps thrust into culmination more
decisively and discontinuously than otherwise would have occurred. Because the High
Wage transition reached its historic peak under a very different ideological and political
aegis in the subsequent decade, there has been a tendency on the part of labor historians to
view the private-order labor initiatives of the 1920’s as a sham, motivated mainly by the
desire to discourage independent unions. The mature, stable workforce certainly did have
enhanced potential for collective organization, as employers learned in a big way during
the 1930’s, and preempting unions surely was part of the basis for welfare capitalism in the
1920’s. But that does not mean that the programs were empty or ineffectual. A study by
Fairris (1997) reports a strong association between productivity growth, reduction in injury
rates, and the prevalence of company unions in an industry.
How much of the observed increase in real wage levels and in productivity can be
“accounted for” by compositional changes in the labor force, such as age, sex, marital
status, language, and education? Perhaps surprisingly, such a calculation has yet to be
carried out. To do so is not straightforward, because the census did not record many of
these personal characteristics by industry and employment categories. Industry and Labor
Department surveys are generally incomplete in their coverage, or lack comparability with
prewar data. We presently are working to develop a set of labor force estimates that would
fill this gap. In advance, however, we offer our expectation for the results: Some part of the
rise in real manufacturing wages may be “accounted for” by compositional changes in the
work force, particularly in certain industries. It follows that some part of the acceleration of
productivity growth may be interpreted as a one-time transition to a higher productivity
level, associated with upgrading. But we do not expect that the full increase in real wages,
nor the full dynamic effect on productivity change, can be factored out in this way. Our
reasoning is, that the learning to make more productive use of longer-term, better-educated
workers, was as much a part of the ongoing effort to adjust technical practice to potential,
as was any other part of the process of technological change. During the 1920’s, that
adjustment was in its infancy, but it was definitely underway.
Synergies Between the New Era Labor Regime and the Dynamo Revolution
The foregoing discussion raises an obvious question: Was there any inherent association
between the rise in the effective utilization of capital – facilitated by electrification – and
the acceleration of labor productivity, reflecting the upgrading of labor standards in
response to increased relative wages and conditions of labor supply? The connection may
not have been close. Each of the two processes had its own historical trajectory, and each
had distinct economic effects. The first-order impact of electrification was to raise capital
productivity; the first-order impact of labor upgrading was on labor productivity. The
acceleration in the growth of total factor productivity may thus be seen as the result of a
fortuitous confluence of these two forces. Yet clearly the two were not completely
independent. Both were facilitated by the favorable macroeconomic conditions of the
1920’s, including the high rate of investment in new plant and equipment, and new
flexibility in plant location and design, which made it possible to implement reorganization
of job assignments and labor systems as well as physical arrangements.37
Indeed we would go further, in arguing that there were positive micro-level
interactions between electrification and rising labor productivity in the 1920’s. The scatter
diagram displayed in Figure E4 relating the growth of capital and labor productivity during
the decade shows there was a measure of positive correlation in the strength of the two
tendencies across the array of industries (already noted in connection with the discussion
of Figure P8). Was this association purely accidental, or were there underlying connections
between the sources of enhanced labor productivity and the capital-saving changes that
were being effected? In this regard it is worth recalling (from Figure E4’s labeled points)
that in relatively high capital-intensity manufacturing operations such as grain-milling,
sugar refining and petroleum refining, where great use never had been made of labor,
productivity growth was skewed more strongly towards relatively rapid capital-savings;
whereas in the comparatively more labor-intensive batch-process manufacture of allied
chemical substances, rubber tires, and motor vehicles, the skew was more towards rapid
rates of reduction in unit labor inputs.
We suggest that the correlation evident from Figure E4 was not a product of mere
coincidence; that the technological and organizational development that underlay the
sudden appearance of gains in capital productivity during the 1920’s also exerted a positive
influence on the efficacy of labor time, at least in some of the industries responsible for the
decade’s remarkable record. Although our discussion must be more conjectural at this
point than we would wish, the following three possibilities deserve notice:
(a) The flow of materials through the plant, both in directness of the layout and the speed
and reliability of transmission, reduced the amount of worker down-time during the day,
and hence increased the effective rate of utilization of labor capacity. Electrification
facilitated the mechanization of routine unskilled tasks, such as materials handling.
(b) Improved internal coordination and throughput increased the vulnerability of plant
systems to disruption at particular points, and increased the potential costs of such
disruptions. Hence, the new systems placed a premium on mature, reliable, longer-term
employees, and the upgrading of hiring standards.
(c) Localization of electric power supply through unit drive is likely to have increased the
scope for individual specialization and exercise of discretion, making it possible to utilize
more highly trained workers effectively, and to develop new skills on the job.
These points of connection presumably affected different industries in very
different ways, depending on the prior evolution of their technologies and labor force
characteristics.  They have in common an increased focus on the selection and retention of
workers. But in some cases the selection took the form of brutally increased machine-
tending responsibilities, as in the “stretch-out” system in cotton textiles. In other cases
electrification may have increased the exercise of cognitive skills and discretion by
individual workers, as with the teletype operators and pressman employed in the printing
and publishing industry. In examples of each type, new technology facilitated increased
labor productivity by facilitating worker selection, monitoring and control of performance.
The emphasis placed on new hiring standards for worker selection and retention
raises the question of the role of rising levels of schooling in the productivity revolution. A
recent study by Goldin and Katz (1998) identifies the era surrounding World War I as the
origin of “technology-skill complementarity,” the widely observed modern tendency for
new technologies disproportionately to favor the employment of more highly trained and
educated labor. Correspondingly, Goldin (1998) documents the spectacular, uniquely
American rise of the “high school movement” after 1910, as graduation from high school38
ceased to be the exception and began to be the norm – at least outside of the South. The
male high school graduation rate, for example, stood at 10-15 percent for the cohort born
in the 1890’s, but rose to nearly 50 percent for those born after World War I.
30 Working
backward from the comprehensive schooling data presented in the 1940 census, Goldin
and Katz (1998) show that the diffusion of high school graduates among manufacturing
industries was extremely uneven. Those industries drawing upon new emerging science-
based technologies, such as aircraft, electrical machinery, and petroleum refining,
employed large numbers of high school graduates in both blue- and white-collar jobs, and
it appears that this pattern goes back at least as far as the 1910’s. Goldin and Katz do not
advance this analysis as a cause of the productivity revolution of the 1920’s. But the
historical association between the two sets of phenomena is so suggestive, that such a
proposed hypothesis would seem to be only a matter of time.
31 Can the human capital
formed in the high school revolution explain the manufacturing productivity revolution of
the 1920’s?
Having framed this hypothesis, we must say that we regard it with some
skepticism. At best, there may have been a positive correlation between productivity
growth rates and those industries identified as “high-education” industries by Claudia
Goldin and Lawrence Katz (1998, p. 708), and compiled here in Table 5.
Nonferrous metals, Dairy products, and Petroleum Refining are three examples of
industries in this top education bracket (more than one-third of employees high school
graduates in 1940), and all had productivity growth rates in excess of 5.0 percent per year
for the 1920’s. But productivity performance was also strong in many industries that made
little use of high school graduates. Some of the most spectacular productivity growth was
recorded in Tobacco Products (chiefly cigarettes), Rubber Products (chiefly tires and
tubes), Iron and Steel (chiefly blast furnaces), and Transportation Equipment (chiefly
automobiles), all of which grew at better than 8 percent per year during the 1920s, with
little benefit from workers with high school diplomas. Thus, upgrading of educational
standards for manufacturing employment to the high school level may have contributed
something, but it could not have been the full story for the productivity revolution of this
decade.
Could the contribution of secondary education to manufacturing productivity be
concealed in the industrial firm’s white collar workforce? Using the available data for
1940, Goldin and Katz report that employment of high school graduates in blue collar jobs
was positively correlated with rising employment of high-school-educated white collar
workers, both observed in industries drawing on new science-based technologies. Yet
Fabricant’s data for the 1920’s shows that average productivity growth for “total”
manufacturing employees was almost precisely equal to productivity growth for wage-
earners alone (5.0 percentage points per year).  In manufacturing as a whole, the shares of
employment in the two categories show almost no change between 1919 and 1929,
although the non-production workforce had grown more rapidly during the preceding
decades.
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What about the cognitive content of new manufacturing jobs? Goldin and Katz
draw upon detailed job descriptions and qualifications, developed by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics between 1918 and 1921, emphasizing the increasing role of schooling-based
skills. Examples of key terms include “knowledge of weights and measures,” “record-
keeping and computations,” “knowledge of how to set machines and test results,” “special
ability to interpret drawings,” “well-versed in grammar, spelling, punctuation;” one even
encounters references to scientific knowledge such as “ability to mix the chemicals,”
“knowledge of electricity,” or “general knowledge of photography.” These occupational
descriptions do make interesting reading, and they clearly confirm the Goldin-Katz result
that there were distinct industry clusterings in job requirements and qualifications. In older
industries such as meatpacking and cotton manufactures, virtually no jobs are listed as
having any required level of schooling at all. A typical entry in meatpacking identifies
“good health and a willingness to work in a meat-packing house” as all that was looked for
in an applicant for a general butcher’s job. Even the “most important and skilled worker in
the weaving room” (the loom fixer) was expected to have no more than a common school
education. In these industries, it was well accepted that a high school diploma was as good
as a bus ticket out of town and out of that line of work. For newer industries drawing on
newer technologies, in contrast, the job descriptions imply that positive value was invested
in a wider range of individual traits and qualifications.
What is striking, however, is just how limited the expected levels of cognitive
mastery actually were, even in the newest and most scientific industries. Medicinal
Manufacturing, for example, was clearly a modern industry with a science-based
technology. But the great majority of job listings for this industry called for only a
common school education; examples include finishing worker, ten types of pharmaceutical
workers, plaster maker, and veterinary hospital attendant. For the job called “chemical
worker,” the occupational requirements manual states that “schooling depends on the40
aptitude of the employee, preferably, at least, a common school and some high school
training.” In electrical manufacturing, the majority of jobs asked only for common school
education, sometimes with additional technical training; another handful of job categories
were listed as “high school preferable;” and no more than a small elite class of jobs
specifically called for high school graduates. Looking ahead from the perspective of 1918-
1921, it appears to us that a wide range of schooling-enhanced traits were represented in
standard manufacturing job descriptions – some cognitive, some attitudinal and behavioral
– but for most jobs common school education was thought to be adequate. Actual
command of scientific knowledge as a job requirement was limited to a tiny fraction of the
overall work force, and these positions typically required post-secondary training if not
professional degrees.
To be clear on this point, we are by no means denying a linkage between the
productivity revolution of the 1920’s and the roughly coincident extension of high school
education in the country at large. Yet, we see the connection as broad and simultaneous in
character, part of the general transition to a more stable, carefully selected, high-wage,
high-productivity labor force. It is hardly surprising that new and more rapidly growing
industries adapted their hiring criteria and job descriptions to match the curriculum of high
school education. But only in part did such an adaptation represent required cognitive
dimensions of the job. Of equal prominence in the job qualifications are phrases
representing individual attributes of patience and reliability that might well be confirmed
by receipt of a high school diploma. Drawing from the manual for Office Employees, we
find that a file clerk “should be a keen observer, possess a good memory and a mind for
detail. Should be thoroughly conscientious, accurate, and alert.” A ledger clerk should
possess “good penmanship; neatness; accuracy...should know how to use an adding
machine.” A mail clerk should display “carefulness; accuracy; honesty; knowledge of
different classes and rates of mail matter and office routine.” An order clerk should
demonstrate “intelligence; accuracy; ability to learn readily the products sold by the firm.”
And so on.
Employers probably were on sound ground in assuming that traits such as these
were likely to be well-represented in high school graduates. More questionable is the
assumption that extending years of public schooling should be seen as a direct response to
more demanding cognitive requirements of the workforce, generated by new
manufacturing technologies. In explaining cross-state variation in the spread of high school
education, Goldin (1998) reports that the relative importance of manufacturing in a state
was in fact a negative influence. Furthermore, in his study of evolving employment
relations in Philadelphia, Walter Licht (1992) reports that increases in the compulsory
school-leaving age were never welcomed by either employers or by the bulk of the
students; these policy changes were part of the broad policy trend to exclude teenagers
from the labor force, and for the most part not a response to rising educational demands by
employers. The one education policy initiative explicitly intended to improve the match
between high school studies and job requirements, vocational training, was universally
regarded as unsuccessful in the U.S. during the 1920’s, as has been the case also in more
recent decades (Osterman 1981).
5. Conclusion
In concluding, we must acknowledge the conjectural nature of much of the argument about
the micro-level connections between factory electrification, labor force upgrading and the
acceleration of productivity growth in U.S. manufacturing. To understand fully the41
dynamics of the 1890-1914 TFP growth pause, and the post-1919 surge, it will be
necessary to integrate studies of changes at the plant level with analyses of the diffusion
both within industries and across industry boundaries of the new regime of production.
Further, it seems likely that this line of inquiry would in turn necessitate some re-
examination and improvement of the available measures of industrial outputs and inputs,
with an eye to making proper allowances for hitherto neglected quality changes that are
distorting the details of our quantitative picture of the productivity surge.
We also should notice that the 1920’s saw the consolidation of still other
technological and organizational innovations whose proximate origins can be traced back
to developments in the pre-World War I era, particularly those involving the use of
telecommunications, information processing, storage and retrieval, and applications of
statistical analysis for business management and control. These have been the subject of
recent attention in historical studies carried out by James Beniger (1986), JoAnne Yates
(1989), Margaret Leverstein (1998), and others.
32 It is plausible to think that in addition to
their direct effects, among which the introduction into manufacturing enterprises of non-
production employees with higher levels of educational attainment certainly figured
prominently, these aspects of “the information and control revolution” in industry may
have had synergetic productivity interactions with the developments that have been
examined here.
While the existence and nature of those particular links remain to be identified
through further historical research, enough has been said here to support the central
contention that major surges of productivity advance are likely to be traceable not so much
to the concatenation of many individual, independent and industry-specific “causes,” as to
the confluence of generic developments that were interrelated. Those inter-connections
have been seen to run either through the logic of technical and organizational
complementaries, or through the spillovers generated in the process of applying a general
purpose technology, or commonalities in the modes whereby firms adjusted their internal
organizational routines in response to major alterations in the structure of the markets for
their (labor) inputs. The “mushroom” metaphor may fit better in earlier or later eras of
much retarded aggregate productivity growth; but that particular conceptualization does
not explain why TFP growth for the economy as a whole goes through alternating periods
of productivity surge and slowdown.
Our discussion carries the further implication that there are some serious distortions
of reality in the conceptualization of economic growth that is conveyed by the
conventional “growth accounting” approach. The aim in exercises of that kind – whether
pursued for a specific sector or for the economy as a whole – is to quantify the
contributions made from distinct and independent “sources.” But the particular historical
episode upon which we have focused provides a clear illustration of the salient limitations
of that approach to understanding productivity growth dynamics. The patent non-neutrality
of innovation during this era (in both the Hicksian and Harrodian senses) makes it
theoretically unjustified to try to separate sharply the effects of technological and
organizational advances from those of changing factor proportions, in the way that growth
accountants often give an impression of having done.  Furthermore, non-neutrality vitiates
the basis for identifying the TFP residual – however so refined a measure thereof may have
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been obtained – with “the rate of innovation” taking place in the economic entity
concerned.
Thus, the acceleration of TFP growth in U.S. manufacturing industries during the
1920’s has been seen to have reflected a general weakening, and in many industries an
outright reversal, of the previous bias towards capital-deepening. And the timing of that
change in the nature and direction of implemented innovations, as distinct from such
quickening as may have occurred in the pace of “advances in knowledge,” was bound up
directly and indirectly with the coincident transformation of labor market conditions and
the long-anticipated industrial application of the “unit drive” system of factory
electrification.
Might there have been some background conditions, left implicit by our discussion,
that made this all possible in the U.S. during the “New Era,” and more so there than
elsewhere? That, too, must be acknowledged. The industrial concentration movement of
the pre-1908 years might have played such a role, preparing the ground by stabilizing the
corporate competitive environment and so making it possible for the larger firms to extend
their planning horizons and undertake longer-term adjustments to the altered structure of
the post-World War I labor market. A sharp jump in real wage costs, however, would not
necessarily stimulate a takeoff in labor productivity growth, especially not if that required
heavy investment in new plant and equipment. Thus, there may also have been have been a
somewhat fortuitous link between the ability of the buoyant macroeconomic conditions
after 1921 to stimulate new fixed investments in industrial plant and equipment, and the
micro-level sources of reduction in marginal capital-output ratios. Further study in a
comparative context may illuminate these and other historical circumstances that made
possible the episode of remarkable productivity performance that we have here identified.
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